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RULES OF EVIDENCE AND SUBSTANTIVE
POLICY
David P. Leonard *
I.
Although the modem trial serves a complex blend of functions,1
most would agree that its primary purpose is to determine and vindicate
the substantive legal rights of the parties.2 In both civil and criminal
trials, we search for some sense of historical "truth," however elusive it
may be, in an effort to determine the rights and obligations of the parties
and the necessity of remedial action or punishment. And for better or for
worse, in American trials an elaborate system of formalized rules and
standards governs the nature of evidence that the trier of fact may hear
and the process by which that evidence may be offered.
Because these rules of evidence do not purport to establish or limit
substantive rights, one could conceive of them as subordinate to rules of
law that do define such rights. Thus, when two parties litigate their respective rights and obligations following an intersection collision between
their automobiles, tort law creates and circumscribes those rights. If
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., 1974, University of California at San Diego; J.D., 1977, University of California, Los Angeles. The author wishes to
thank Mark Cammack, Norman Garland, Victor Gold, Christopher Mueller, Samuel Pillsbury and Myrna Raeder for their comments.
1. What purposes the trial serves is, of course, a very complex question, and one that
merits a great deal of further study. I have previously discussed some of the trial's purposes in
David P. Leonard, The Use of Characterto Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsisin the
Law of Evidence, 58 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1, 31-42 (1986-87); see also Milner S. Ball, The Play's
the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 81, 115 (1975) (asserting that judicial proceedings are similar to theater production);
Mark Cammack, The Evidence Rules and the Ritual of Trials: "Saying Something of Something", 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 783, 789-91 (1992) ("If formality and repetition is the hallmark
of ritual, the judicial trial must be counted as among the most decidedly ritualistic institutions
of our society."); Charles R. Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proofand the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1360 (1985) (stating that trial truth-seeking
process is concerned1 with justice); Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt andPermissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1194 (1979) (proposing that objective in trial system is to determine truth and resolve dispute); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by
Mathematics: PrecisionandRitual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329, 1376 (1971)
(asserting that lawsuit is both search for truth and ritual).
2. IA JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 37.1, at 1018

(Tillers rev. 1983) ("Accurate factfinding should be the central purpose of the law of
evidence.").
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Party A is found to have driven without exercising reasonable care for
the safety of another driver, Party B, and that breach of the standard of
reasonable care is found to have caused damage to B, the law of tort
permits3 entry of judgment for B. Similarly, if in a prosecution of D for
the murder of V, D is found to have killed V while possessing the requisite mental state, the criminal law permits a verdict of guilty. In both
examples it is substantive law that governs the parties' rights and obligations; ostensibly, neither the law of evidence nor any other set of rules
has that effect.
This reasoning, however, is flawed, and the flaw can be seen even in
these two simple examples. To say, in the first, that A may be held liable
to B "if it is found" that A failed to exercise reasonable care and caused
B's damage is to ignore the potentially important effect that rules of civil
procedure and evidence might have on the outcome of the case. First,
trials do not proceed merely by the recitation of facts or the telling of
competing stories. Rather, they operate within a framework that allocates among the parties the risk that insufficient evidence will be available to tip the jurors' minds in either direction. We call the allocation of
these risks "burdens of persuasion," and in the hypothetical auto accident case, the law allocates in A's favor the risk of inadequate or ambiguous evidence. The jury will be charged to find for A, the defendant,
unless B can persuade the jurors that A breached a duty of reasonable
care and that such breach caused B's damage. And in the criminal case
the court will instruct the jury that it must acquit D unless the prosecution has proven D's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Furthermore, not only will the allocation to B of the burden of persuasion require that B produce evidence sufficient to tip the scales in her
favor, but such allocation also places upon B the burden of "going forward," or offering evidence, to meet that standard. Unless B offers evidence so overwhelming as to justify a judgment in her favor without even
resorting to the jury (something which rarely occurs), A is entitled to
have the jury decide the case even if she offers no evidence at all. Even
though the technical burden the law places on B in a civil case is only to
offer evidence sufficient to support a conclusion that she has proven the
elements of the cause of action by a "preponderance of the evidence," the
fact that the law places such a burden upon B rather than A has potentially significant effects. Specifically, the rules of civil procedure that es3. One might say "requires" a judgment for Party B but given the freedom enjoyed by
jurors and the relative inviolability of their deliberative processes, "requires" would be too
strong a word. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
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tablish such burdens affect B's chances of having her rights vindicated by
the trial.
The same analysis holds true in the hypothetical murder prosecution. The process of "finding" that D committed the killing while possessing the requisite mental state is not a neutral one. In theory, the trial
begins with the deck stacked heavily against the prosecution;4 unless it
can offer rather strong evidence against D--evidence strong enough to
survive a motion for acquittal-D need never offer any testimony in her
defense. And while it might be true that in practice, the civil "preponderance" burden is not often significant enough to affect the vindication
of substantive rights, it is undeniable that the prosecution's burden to
prove its criminal case "beyond a reasonable doubt" places upon it a
rather heavy burden. The risk of error caused by a lack of evidence, in
other words, is clearly shouldered by the prosecution.5
One might argue that little is achieved by labeling rules creating
burdens as "procedural rules" rather than substantive rules, and then
remarking on the effect these rules can have on the determination of substantive rights. While the line between "procedural" and "substantive"
rules is not clear, it is clear that in our normal consideration of, for example, rules of tort law, we do not think of burdens of persuasion as among
the "elements" a party must prove in order to prevail. The rule placing
the burden of persuasion on a party is a rule allocating the risk of error,
not one establishing the parameters of responsibility in those cases in
which the evidence necessary to effect a reasonable construction of the
facts is available. Also, it is demonstrable that at least within some
range, the designation of particular rules is a matter of broad agreement.
Few would argue, for example, that rules setting forth the number of
days one has to answer a complaint6 or governing whether a complaint
must be signed by the party or attorney7 are rules of substantive law.
This does not mean, however, that even those rules that we would
broadly agree are procedural do not affect substantive rights. A party's
4. This is not necessarily true in practice, of course. It is very likely that jurors assume
even before hearing evidence that the prosecution has at least a relatively strong case. Moreover, jurors likely realize that very weak cases usually do not reach trial, and that while the
very strongest cases are generally settled by plea bargaining, the state is unlikely to expend
significant resources trying extremely doubtful cases.
5. The criminal defendant's constitutional rights, in particular the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, U.S. CONST. amend. V, also adds to the prosecution's burden. Not only may the prosecution not require the defendant to testify but the fact
finder is prohibited in most instances from drawing an adverse inference from the defendant's
failure to take the stand. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965).
6. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a).
7. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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failure to answer a complaint within the specified period of time, or to
sign a complaint, can result in a default judgment against that party that
is manifestly contrary to the result that would be reached if the actual
facts of the case were to come to light. Nevertheless, for various good
reasons, the law allows these contrary results.
The goal of this Essay is to begin to construct a similar analysis of
the functions of evidence rules. Many of our rules of evidence do not
merely facilitate the proof of facts. They also have a significant effect on
the law's substantive goals, sometimes helping to further those goals and
sometimes impeding them. It is important to recognize this fact about
rules of evidence both as a way to better understand our complex evidence rules and as a guide to reforming them. And it is particularly
appropriate to address this question in the context of a symposium devoted to exploring whether evidence law matters. As this Essay will
demonstrate, one reason evidence law does indeed matter is that it plays
an important role in the effectuation of our law's substantive aims.
II.
If trials function primarily to determine and vindicate substantive
legal rights, it follows that the rules governing the evidentiary processrules that establish what evidence will be admissible and that govern the
permissible means of offering admissible evidence-should be
subordinate. Those rules must in some significant fashion serve the overriding goals of the substantive law.' It would be foolish to argue that the
trial exists in any meaningful way to vindicate the evidentiary rules
themselves.
Even a quick look at the evidence rules, however, reveals that the
situation is more complex than at first it appears to be. The rules serve a
multitude of both substantive and non-substantive purposes. Perhaps the
most central (though most overlooked) provision of the Federal Rules of
Evidence specifically refers to the purposes and interpretation of the entire set of rules: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that
the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." 9
There is much more to this short rule than at first meets the eye, and
8. "Perhaps adjective law in the courtroom so clearly is an adjunct to accomplishing
something else, such as truth-finding, that no one is tempted to believe it is an end in itself."
Roger C. Park, Evidence Scholarship, Old and New, 75 MINN. L. REV. 849, 866 (1991). This
is true even though the law's substantive goals are at times elusive or conflicting.
9. FED. R. EVID. 102.
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perhaps more to the purposes of the rules than can fairly be implied from
the language of this single provision. In fact, examining the purposes of
evidence rules more specifically would reveal that rules are designed for a
wide variety of purposes: (1) to enhance the accuracy of factfinding; (2)
to provide for the satisfactory termination of the dispute; (3) to assure
evenhanded treatment of the parties and fairness to their witnesses; (4) to
aid in creating incentives or disincentives to particular forms of external10 conduct; (5) to prevent unwarranted intrusions into the private lives
of the parties and witnesses; (6) to lend order and clarity to the presentation of testimony and exhibits; (7) to control the power of the state
through its representatives, the judge and jury; and (8) to allocate the
decision-making power between judge and jury.
In serving these various purposes, evidence rules sometimes directly
affect substantive policy, sometimes have only a secondary effect, and at
other times seem to have no impact on the rules of substantive law. Selected evidence rules will be discussed in light of these three possibilities.
III.
Many evidence rules directly affect substantive policy and do so in a
number of ways. The rule prohibiting evidence of subsequent remedial
measures when offered to prove negligence or culpable conduct 12 is an
example. Evidence that a landlord placed abrasive strips on a common
stairway after a tenant slipped and fell on the stairs is not admissible in a
negligence action brought by the injured tenant if the tenant wishes to
offer such evidence to demonstrate that the stairs were in an unreasonably dangerous condition at the time of the accident. The rule affects substantive policy in at least two ways, the first of which provides the rule's
primary purpose to serve a particular substantive policy, and the second
of which is a necessary negative side effect to excluding the evidence.
First, the rule is designed to have a positive effect on an important
substantive goal of tort law. Although most would agree that tort law
functions primarily to compensate victims of accidents,' 3 it is also certainly designed to create incentives to engaging in particular conduct and
10. By "external" conduct I mean conduct other than at the trial itself--conduct in conducting the everyday affairs of life or business.
11. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 611 (court shall exercise control over mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to ascertain truth, avoid inefficiency and
protect witnesses).
12. FED. R. EVID. 407.
13. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 20
(5th ed. 1984).
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In particular, tort

law constantly seeks ways to encourage people to take steps to minimize
the risks of accidents. Even more particularly, it seeks to create incen-

tives for those best able to take accident avoidance measures-one in a
position to make a safety improvement in an unsafe product or condition
is perhaps the paradigm example. Though there is plenty of room to
doubt the true effect of legal rules on external conduct, 15 it is at least

logical to assume that were it not for the subsequent remedial measure
rule, the landlord in our hypothetical slip-and-fall case would hesitate
before repairing the stairway.' 6 The rule is therefore designed to deter

just such hesitation, and by doing so, to lessen overall social harm.' 7 To
the extent that it affects external behavior, it is an evidence rule that
directly serves a substantive function.

Exclusion of evidence pursuant to this rule, however, also has a negative effect on the law's ability to achieve substantive goals. While not

especially probative in many cases, evidence of a party's subsequent repair certainly satisfies the relevance test. There might be a number of

reasons why a landlord would improve the condition of the stairs following an accident, but it is at least possible that in the landlord's mind, the
stairs were in an unsafe state at the time of the accident. And because we
can expect the landlord to be in a good position to judge the dangerousness of the stairs used by tenants, evidence of the repair under such cir-

cumstances certainly makes the possibility of unreasonable danger at the
time of the accident "more likely than it would be without the evi14. Id. at 25.
15. Such doubts exist both for "substantive" and "procedural" rules, and particularly for
the latter. Are social actors aware of the existence of rules of evidence governing the admissibility of their conduct at a trial? Even if they are aware, as might be the case for certain wellpublicized rules such as the Miranda rule, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), to what
extent can and do such rules actually affect behavior? These are difficult questions beyond the
scope of this Essay; for present purposes it is enough to recognize that some evidence rules are
designed to have external incentive effects.
16. Of course the rule will not affect the landlord's conduct unless she is aware of the rule,
which is somewhat doubtful. In many cases, we might expect the landlord simply to repair the
stairs to avoid future accidents and her potential liability for those accidents. Thus, landlords
might do the "right thing" even though ignorant of the rule excluding evidence of the repair.
In a larger corporate setting, however, there is a greater chance that the rule will be known, or
at least will become known in time to affect conduct. We might expect that a large manufacturer, somewhat more sophisticated in matters of liability, will contact counsel before making
a safety alteration in its product. The manufacturer is somewhat more likely to make the
repair after being advised that evidence of the repair will not be admissible to prove the defectiveness of the product in its prior condition.
17. Not all jurisdictions, of course, adhere to the subsequent remedial measure rule.
Maine, for example, maintains exactly the opposite provision in its rules of evidence, providing
that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible. ME. R. EVID. 407(a).
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dence." I Because the evidence is relevant, knowing of the repair might
enhance the accuracy of the jury's factfinding and help it to determine
correctly the substantive rights and obligations of the parties. The evidence rule denying the jury the right to hear such evidence thus reduces
the possibility of accurate factfinding to some degree, and the risk of inaccurate assessment of the parties' fights and obligations becomes
greater. Thus, the rule excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures serves, in one respect, as an obstacle to the vindication of the tort
principle that a landlord should be held responsible for failure to exercise
reasonable care for the safety of tenants.19
The subsequent remedial measure rule, therefore, has an intended
positive effect on the important substantive policy of accident reduction
but at some loss to the goal of accurate adjudication. The rule does not
appear to serve any goals directly related to the trial process itself; it is
almost purely a rule of evidence mandated by the demands of the tort
law.
The rule excluding evidence of liability insurance2 ° appears to be
much the same, but deeper analysis reveals a subtle difference. Like the
subsequent remedial measure rule, it arguably increases the risk of inaccurate factfinding by preventing the jury from hearing and considering
relevant evidence (though the argument that a party's possession of liability insurance might, for example, affect driving behavior is highly attenuated).2 1 And also like that rule, it exists in part to encourage certain
18. See FED. R. EVID. 401.

19. There is, of course, an argument that the rule excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures enhances the accuracy of factfinding by seeking to avoid unfair prejudice to the
landlord. According to this argument, jurors, upon hearing that the landlord herself thought

the condition of the stairs to be dangerous, might overvalue the evidence and ignore other
evidence that points to lack of defect. In addition, the jurors might seek to punish the landlord
for not acting earlier when she arguably knew of the danger. Each of these possible forms of
prejudice enhances the risk of an improper judgment for the plaintiff tenant. I do not believe,
however, that the risk of these forms of prejudice is particularly great in the application of the
subsequent remedial measures rule. A stronger argument can be made in the application of the
liability insurance rule. It is also possible that the subsequent remedial measures rule serves as
a mechanism for furthering a different substantive goal of tort law-the prevention of future
accidents-while sacrificing, to some degree, the principle of liability for harms negligently
caused. If we value the prevention of future harm more highly than the principle of holding
persons liable for the effects of their past negligence, the evidence rule helps to effectuate the
hierarchy of these somewhat conflicting substantive policies.
20. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 411.

21. It has been suggested that the evidence is irrelevant. See, e.g., MICHAEL H. GRAHAM,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL § 411.1, at 125 (1967) ("Evidence that a

defendant is insured against liability is irrelevant on the issue of fault, for a person by reason of
being insured is felt to be no more likely to act negligently or otherwise wrongfully."). Some
have stated doubts about the relevance of such evidence. See EDWARD W. CLEARY, McCoR-

804

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:797

external conduct, in this case carrying liability insurance which helps to
further the compensation function of tort law. However, the rule excluding evidence of liability insurance might also decrease the risk of inaccurate factfinding by lessening the risk of unfair prejudice to the insured
party. Specifically, it is reasonable to fear that if jurors are told that a
defendant in a tort case possesses liability insurance, they will be more
likely to find against that party, even if they believe that party's conduct
did not violate a duty toward the plaintiff, they may reason that any
judgment awarded would not come out of that defendant's pocket but
rather out of the insurance company's deep pockets. The rule thus gives
at the same time it takes away; though it increases the risk of inaccurate
factfinding by excluding arguably relevant evidence, it decreases that
same risk by limiting the chance of unfair prejudice against the insured
party. As with the subsequent remedial measure rule, the liability insurance rule does not appear to serve any function related to the adjudicatory process itself. Its purpose is essentially to serve the goals of tort law
directly.
There are a few other evidence rules with even more overwhelmingly substantive effects. The rule excluding statements classified as
"verbal acts" or "words of independent legal significance" from the definition of hearsay is an example. 2 Suppose P sues D for breach of contract, claiming that P orally offered to sell D a specified number of
widgets for a specified price, that D orally accepted the offer, that P delivered the widgets, but that D breached the contract by refusing to pay
for them. Assume further that the statute of frauds would not require
this contract to be reduced to writing. P claims that she entered into a
valid oral contract with D, and that D's refusal to pay for the delivered
goods constituted a breach of contract. D, on the other hand, claims that
she never reached an agreement with P, and that P's transfer of the widgets was in payment of a previous debt.
§ 201 (3d ed. 1984). If the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence had
believed such evidence to be irrelevant, it is unlikely they would have thought it necessary to
create a special rule governing it, given the total prohibition of irrelevant evidence in Rule 402.
FED. R. EVID. 402. The drafters recognized that such evidence might be relevant, though of
little value: "At best the inference of fault from the fact of insurance coverage is a tenuous
one, as is its converse." FED. R. EvID. 411 advisory committee's note.
22. Rule 801(c) states that "'[h]earsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted" FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (emphasis added).
"If the significance of an offered.statement lies solely in the fact that it was made, no issue
is raised as to the truth of anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay." FED. R. EVID.
801(c) advisory committee's note (citing Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 181
F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 558 (1951)).
MICK ON EVIDENCE
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How will P seek to prove that a contract existed? Contract law generally requires that a party prove offer, acceptance and consideration.
Thus, in this case, one item of proof will be that P herself said to D, "I
offer to sell you ten widgets for one hundred dollars." Without proof of
her own statement, the offer, P cannot prove an offer was made and
therefore that a contract existed, at least on the facts of the hypothetical
as previously stated. The law of evidence, of course, does not interfere
with P's proof in this regard. P's own words are treated as non-hearsay,
and no other rule of evidence forbids their admission.
Why is this statement treated as non-hearsay? The traditional answer, of course, is that the words themselves are not being offered as
proof of anything; they are the thing itself. That is, the speaking of the
words, "I offer to sell you ten widgets for one hundred dollars" is the
very "act" in issue-the making of the offer. The only difference between
this "act" and other acts at issue in a trial, the explanation goes, is that
this act happens to be verbal. The speaking of the words is as independently significant as driving your car into a pedestrian in a crosswalk.
The act of speaking the words has "independent legal significance."
After having taught evidence for a number of years, this explanation
has become so ingrained in my mind that I sometimes find it difficult to
see the problem in any other way. Certainly this explanation is correct,
but I can understand why students often have difficulty learning the
"verbal act" concept. It seems quite obvious to them that, in the language of the prevailing definition of hearsay, P's words constitute "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." 3 As the students see it, P is sitting on the witness stand testifying about something she said to D out of court. Her out-of-court statement asserted that she was making an offer. And the words are being
offered to prove that an offer was, in fact, made. This analysis, of course,
is flawed: P's words were not asserting that she was making an offer,
they were the making of the offer itself. Thus, the words were not really
assertive, and as a nonassertion, do not constitute a "statement" within
the prevailing definition of hearsay.2' The flaw is very real, of course, but
at times, taking the students through an examination of why this is not a
"statement" for purposes of the hearsay rule proves most dissatisfying.
They simply refuse (at least at first) to accept that this kind of statement
is not analytically hearsay.
23.

FED.

R. EVID. 801(c).

24. FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
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When students are running into this conceptual difficulty with the
"verbal acts" rule, I suggest they take a mental step back and consider
the matter from a different and perhaps deeper perspective, one based on
the relative places of evidence law and the law of contract. I try to develop in the classroom the following alternative explanation for the rule:
the law of contract enforces certain oral arrangements. If the law of evidence were to exclude as hearsay a statement that contract law were to
treat as an offer, the law of evidence would effectively invalidate one significant area of contract law. That is, by excluding proof of the offer,
evidence law would make proving an oral contract virtually impossible.
If such proof is impossible, oral contracts would be unenforceable whenever a dispute arises as to their existence.
To some extent this analysis oversimplifies contract theory. That is,
whether the analysis is wrong likely depends on whether we adhere to a
subjective or an objective theory of contracts.2" If the prevailing objective theory were used, the offer would in fact be proven by demonstrating
that the words "I offer to sell you ten widgets for one hundred dollars"
were spoken by P to D. And in that situation, P's own credibility when
making the statement would not be in issue. All that need be shown is
that she spoke words that would be understood by the reasonable person
as the making of an offer. Under the objective theory of contract, then,
the dangers brought about by the inability to test contemporaneously
with the statement the declarant's sincerity, narrative ability and perception are minimal. The words spoken should not be treated as hearsay.
If, alternatively, the law were to embrace the subjective theory of
contract, the actual intent and understanding of the parties at the time of
the making of the "offer" would be much more important. In particular,
at trial it would be crucial to understand whether P actually intended to
be making an offer when she spoke the words "I offer to sell you ten
widgets for one hundred dollars," whether she meant to make the offer
that a superficial examination of the words she spoke would appear to
support, whether at the time she made the statement she accurately recalled the facts of her own business and her relationship with D, and
whether she was being sincere when she spoke the words. Viewed this
way, her statement does raise hearsay dangers to a far greater degree
than would be the case under an objective theory of contract, and our
inability to cross-examine P contemporaneously with the making of the
statement is more troubling. Classifying the statement as hearsay and
25. See JOHN D.
ed. 1987).

CALAMARI

& JOSEPH M.

PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §

2-2 (3d
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excluding it from evidence, then, would make more sense from an evidentiary standpoint, even if not from a contractual one.
Even given this possible oversimplification of contract law, the interference explanation is in some sense better than the more technical evidence law explanation because it represents an explicit recognition of the
relative places of contract law and evidence law in the hierarchy of legal
rules. In this situation, evidence law cannot exclude the words without
interfering with important substantive goals of contract law. Therefore,
it admits the evidence.26
IV.
Some rules of evidence have only an indirect effect on substantive
policy. One of the central provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence
grants the trial court great leeway in controlling the mode and order of
interrogation of witnesses.2 7 Because each trial is different, decisions
about such things as the order in which witnesses will be called and the
subjects which may be explored on cross-examination must be made by
the judge in context, keeping in mind the overall purposes of the rules.
This rule most clearly implicates such purposes as lending order and
clarity to the presentation of evidence, assuring fair and evenhanded
treatment of the parties, preventing unwarranted intrusions into the private lives of parties and witnesses, and providing a forum for the satisfactory termination of the dispute. Standing alone, these purposes seem
unrelated to the substantive rules giving rise to the trial or any other
substantive policies. They are, for the most part, purposes related to the
conduct of the trial itself-its orderly, efficient operation as well as the
treatment of those who come before the court as parties or witnesses.
Though such goals as the fair and humane treatment of parties and witnesses are hardly "non-substantive," neither are they the reasons why the
trial is occurring in the first place. The trial is overwhelmingly about
external conduct, not about the rules governing the mode and order of
presentation of evidence at that trial.
Again, however, this analysis must be taken at least one additional
step. Though the primary purpose of the rule concerning the mode and
order of interrogation of witnesses is directed to the conduct of the proceeding itself, the trial judge's exercise of judgment in applying that rule
26. Though raising the subtle conceptual problem discussed earlier, it might be preferable
for the evidence law to treat words of independent legal significance as hearsay but subject to
an exception. The purpose of the exception would be necessity. It would be more difficult,
though not impossible, to rest the exception on the reliability of such statements.
27. FED. R. EVID. 611.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:797

can clearly have some impact on the goals of the substantive law. The
most obvious impact is on the goal of accurate factfinding. If evidence is
presented in a chaotic, incoherent way, the jury will be far less able to
determine accurately the events giving rise to the trial and inaccurate
determinations of fact lead to inaccurate assessments of legal rights and
responsibilities. So even the "mode and order" rule has substantive impact in the limited sense that it can be used to increase the chances of
accurate assessment of the rights and responsibilities created by the substantive law.28
Another set of evidence rules that has only an indirect substantive
impact are those rules allocating functions between judge and jury.
Though such provisions can be found throughout the Federal Rules of
Evidence,2 9 one general rule governs most situations.3 0 That rule allocates most determinations of preliminary fact to the court, but leaves to
the jury the determination of preliminary fact in the conditional relevancy context: "When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit the evidence upon, or
subject to, the introduction of evidence
sufficient to support a finding of
31
the fulfillment of the condition.,
This rule has a number of purposes unrelated to substantive policy.
Most obviously, it clarifies the tasks of the various actors in the factfinding process. Given that the world does not divide neatly into "questions
of law" and "questions of fact," the statement that the judge decides the
former and the jury the latter obviously does not solve the problem in
some situations. This rule is intended to clarify and distinguish which
questions involving some factual determinations are for the court and
which are for the jury. This makes the trial run more smoothly and predictably and helps to assure that similar trials in different courts are conducted in a relatively consistent way. Another purpose of the rule is
simply to promote efficiency. By allowing the judge to decide certain
facts preliminary to the admission of evidence, the judge can limit the
28. Another less tangible substantive impact has to do with the public perception of the
trial's fairness. If people view trials as chaotic, imbalanced proceedings which will not offer
them the opportunity to present their stories in a coherent logical way, they are less likely to
trust the ability of the law to resolve their disputes, and thus less likely to bring (at least their
civil) disputes to the courts.
29. See, eg., FED. R. EVID. 602 (allocating to jury determination of whether witness had
personal knowledge); FED. R. EvID. 901(a) (allocating to jury determination of whether document or other item has been authenticated); FED. R. EvID. 1008 (allocating to jury functions
in "best evidence rule" situations).
30. FED. R. EVID. 104.
31. FED. R. EvID. 104(b). Whether this rule is in fact coherent is explored in Ronald J.
Allen, The Myth of ConditionalRelevancy, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 871 (1992).
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amount of time that will be spent offering and arguing certain kinds of
evidence, and can shorten and perhaps simplify the trial.
Whether the rule allocating the decision-making power for the determination of preliminary facts has direct substantive impact is a more
complex question that can best be examined with an example. Suppose
X sues Y for personal injury following a collision between their two cars.
Y was carrying a passenger in the back seat. X claims that after the
accident, she got out of her car, walked over to Y's car, asked what happened, and that a voice responded, "I don't know what happened. I fell
asleep before the crash."3 2 If this statement was made by Y, it is relevant, as it would strongly suggest that Y was negligent, and it is admissible as a party admission.3 3 If, however, the statement was made by Y's
passenger, the statement appears not to be relevant because the passenger's having fallen asleep would demonstrate her lack of personal knowledge about the accident. The statement would therefore have no impact
on the determination of Y's negligence. A crucial preliminary fact,
therefore, arises in the context of conditional relevancy: determining
who made the statement. Under the Federal Rules, this question should
be left to the jury. No prejudice will occur to Y if the jury finds that her
passenger made the statement. The jury will ignore the statement when
determining responsibility for the accident. If the jury finds that Y made
the statement, it will properly consider the statement along with all other
relevant evidence.
Suppose, however, that the answer given by whichever occupant of
the car responded was, "I don't know what happened. The windshield
was all fogged up." In this situation, the information offered is relevant
to the determination of responsibility whether it was made by Y or by
her passenger. Yet, if made by the passenger, it is inadmissible hearsay
unless it can be classified as a present sense impression or an excited
utterance, neither of which is likely in the hypothetical. The problem is
that if the jury were permitted to determine the preliminary fact of who
spoke, and the jury decided that the statement was made by the passenger, the jury would likely have a difficult time ignoring the statement
even though it would be instructed to do just that. This is a matter of
human nature. Charged with the nearly impossible task of reconstructing
a past event, and in the undoubted presence of conflicting testimony, the
jurors will grope for any piece of information that allows them to reach
32. This hypothetical and the variant discussed next are drawn from John Kaplan, Of
Mabrus and Zorgs-An Essay in Honor of David Louisell, 66 CAL. L. RFv. 987, 1000-02
(1978).
33. See FED. R. EVID. 901(d)(2)(A).
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an accurate conclusion of fact, and then an appropriate assessment of
legal responsibility. How could the jurors ignore such a probative piece
of information? If the hearsay rule is to be enforced,
the judge must be
34
the one to decide who spoke in this situation.
This is precisely the point for present purposes. The rule allocating
functions between judge and jury has many purposes, but at least one
central purpose is to help ensure that the rules of evidence themselves are
enforced. If the hearsay rule is to be maintained, the judge must generally be the one who decides any preliminary facts necessary to satisfying
an exception to the rule.35 But this analysig alone does not answer the
question of the rule's true impact. To make that determination, we must
examine the purposes of the evidentiary rule being protected by the allocation of certain factfinding to the judge. Here, that rule is the hearsay
rule, and deciding what effect the allocation rule has thus requires asking
why we maintain a hearsay rule. Obviously, that is a complicated question that must be answered as much with reference to history 36 as to
current evidentiary theory. Nevertheless, the rule is designed in large
part to ensure that at least a good deal of the evidence offered against a
party, whether in a civil or a criminal case, is offered in person. This not
only provides the person against whom the evidence is offered with a
chance to face the witness in the courtroom to test the witness's memory,
perception, narrative clarity and sincerity, but also provides the jury with
the opportunity to judge credibility by viewing the witness at the time he
or she makes the damaging statement.
All of this actually suggests at least two broad purposes for the hearsay rule, neither of which is likely to have direct substantive impact in
the sense that it affects external conduct. The first is basic fairness to the
party against whom the evidence is offered, a sense of fair play that
comes from requiring the other side to produce its testimony in person
rather than through reporting out-of-court statements or conducting a
trial by affidavit. This purpose is largely related to the functioning of the
adjudicatory process and, like rules governing the failure to sign a complaint or make an answer within a specified period of time,3 7 it is only
indirectly related to the substantive legal rules that created the claims
34. While it seems clear to me that this would be a question for the court under FED. R.
EvID. 104(a), Professor Kaplan wrote that "[tihe federal rules do not provide any guidance on
the problem." Kaplan, supra note 32, at 1000.
35. In the hypothetical whether the statement was a party admission of Y would actually
turn on whether the statement was non-hearsay under the Federal Rules. For present purposes, this makes no difference.
36. See CLEARY, supra note 21, § 244 for a discussion of the hearsay rule's history.
37. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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and defenses governing the parties' rights and responsibilities. The second broad purpose of the hearsay rule is to promote accuracy in factfinding. To the extent that the hearsay rule requires a party to produce
evidence in person, and to the extent that cross-examination and observation of witnesses' demeanor can test the reliability of their testimony, the
truth is more likely to emerge. This second purpose, then, increases the
odds that the parties' respective substantive legal rights and responsibilities will be determined accurately. This is also largely non-substantive,
at least in its direct impact. Promoting accurate factfinding helps to assure that substantive rights are properly assessed but it does not directly
affect external conduct. At least in the hearsay context, therefore, the
rules allocating functions between judge and jury appear to operate primarily with reference to the adjudicatory process and only indirectly affect substantive policy.
V.
To this point my comments about the impact of evidentiary doctrine
on substantive policy have been largely favorable because in most instances any impact of evidentiary doctrine has been to help further the
goals of the substantive law. Even when evidence rules exclude relevant
evidence and thus arguably impede the determination of truth, an argument generally exists that the rules serve other substantive goals. One
evidentiary principle is more problematic. It is perhaps best represented
by the case of Big Mack Trucking Co. v. Dickerson."3 There, the wife and
children of the deceased Dickerson brought a wrongful death action
against Leday, a truck driver, and Big Mack, Leday's employer, after
Leday's unattended truck, which was parked at a truck stop, rolled and
crushed Dickerson. Plaintiffs claimed that Leday's parked truck rolled
because he had negligently failed to maintain the truck's brakes. The
theory of liability against Big Mack was respondeat superior and there
was no dispute that at the time of the accident Leday was employed by
Big Mack and was acting within the course and scope of his employment.
The problem, however, was proof of negligence. The only evidence establishing the likely reason for the accident was the statements of Leday
himself, who related to a superior and an investigating officer after the
accident that he had been experiencing "air pressure troubles" and that
he had not been keeping the proper air pressure in the braking system.
Both Leday's superior and the investigating officer were permitted, over
38. 497 S.W.2d 283 (rex. 1973), superseded by TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 801(e)(2)(D). See

infra note 50.
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Big Mack's objection, to testify to these statements, and it was the admission of the statements that constituted the evidentiary issue in the case.39
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was error to admit
the statements.
There was no doubt that these statements would be admissible at
trial against Leday. He was a party defendant, and his own words would
constitute an admission and would be allowed into evidence.4" Under
existing Texas law, however, the statements did not fit within any exceptions to the hearsay rule when offered against Big Mack." In reversing,
the court noted:
Respondents assert that in an action against a servant and
master, the master having been joined under respondeat superior, it is not necessary that the evidence proving the servant's
negligence and proximate cause be competent evidence against
the master in order to support a judgment against the master.
The notion is that the master's derivative liability is imposed by
law once the liability facts are proven by evidence competent
against the servant....
We cannot accept such a view. The suggestion is that with
respect to proof of the servant's liability, which we deem an
essential element of plaintiff's case against the master, the
master loses the protection of the hearsay rule. Any reason
which suggests that the master should lose the protection of
that rule would also militate against the master's right to offer
contrary evidence, to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses, to object to evidence on grounds other than hearsay, or, indeed, even
to plead the general denial which requires the plaintiffs to prove
the servant's liability in the first place. 2
Purely as a matter of evidence law, this statement, although exaggerated, is essentially correct. As long as Texas evidence law did not
exclude these statements from the hearsay rule or construe any excep39. Even though plaintiffs had a right to call Leday to testify, they did not call him. Had
he been called, and had he offered evidence consistent with his previous statements, the evidentiary issue in the case would have been avoided.
40. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). The rule classifies party admissions as non-hearsay.
In contrast, many states treat such statements as hearsay but subject to an exception. See, e.g.,
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1220 (West 1966).
41. BigMack, 497 S.W.2d at 289-90. The statements were not admissible as authorized or
vicarious admissions; there was insufficient evidence to establish a foundation for the spontaneous explanation exception, and, because plaintiffs had not demonstrated that Leday was unavailable to testify, the statements were not admissible as declarations against his pecuniary
interest.
42. Id. at 286-87.
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tions to cover them when offered against Big Mack, admission of the
statements seems improper. Big Mack is, indeed, as entitled to the protection of the hearsay rule as is any other party. But from another perspective, the court's ruling is most troubling. The law of respondeat
superior provides that an employer is liable for the tortious conduct of an
employee committed in the course and scope of employment.4 3 This is
perhaps the purest form of strict liability in the tort law today. Not only
is the employer liable without fault but the employer need not have acted
at all on the occasion in question in order to be held liable. The cause of
action is simply as stated: plaintiff must only prove that the servant acted tortiously in the course and scope of employment.
If the only conduct that matters in determining the employer's liability is that of the servant, and evidence is available that would be admissible when offered against the servant to prove that conduct, then
why is that not sufficient to render it competent evidence against the employer? The only reason the evidence is not admissible against the employer is that the technical rules of evidence do not permit it. This seems
to turn matters on their head, subordinating the substantive law to evidentiary rules. Put another way, if the law of evidence demands some
evidence independently admissible against the employer before holding
that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case against it, the law of
evidence appears to be establishing substantial barriers to the vindication
of the substantive policies that the rules of respondeat superior are
designed to serve. The law of evidence, in other words, is making proof
of the servant's wrongdoing insufficient to establish the employer's negligence when the law of respondeat superior says it is sufficient. If in fact
the law of evidence is intended to serve rather than impede the goals of
the substantive law, the decision in Big Mack seems wrong.
Of course, this argument could not be made if the evidence at issue
were not admissible against the servant, as it was in Big Mack. An
anomaly would arise if, by chance, Leday had not been made a party (in
which case his statements would not have constituted admissions). In
such a case, the evidence would be inadmissible against him, and there is
reason to doubt the validity of a rule that depends on whether the servant
happens to have been sued.' But this is a problem unlikely to arise with
any frequency. In most cases, the plaintiff is sure to make the servant a
party defendant, and where the servant is not sued, the reason will most
43. See
44. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957).
TEACHER'S MANUAL TO JOHN KAPLAN & JON WALTZ, EVIDENCE: CASES AND

MATERIALS 51 (6th ed. 1987).
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often be unavailability (in which case the servant's statements would
probably be admissible as declarations against pecuniary interest).
There are two likely responses to this argument. The strongest response is a form of the "slippery slope" argument: if I am willing to
violate evidence rules to help establish a claim in this situation, what
principle could be used to distinguish this case from any case in which
there is a paucity of admissible evidence to establish a party's claim or
defense? While I cannot dismiss concerns about line drawing once I am
willing to breach evidentiary rules in one situation, I think I can in fact
demonstrate that the problem raised by Big Mack is, if not unique, at
least very unusual, and is in any event qualitatively different from other
cases in which there is simply a lack of sufficient admissible evidence to
reach the jury with a claim or defense. What differentiates this situation
is that it involves an inextricable interconnection between the party
against whom the evidence is technically admissible and the party against
whom the evidence is offered. That interconnection is created by principles of substantive law, and it makes the conduct of one party legally
significant to, and indeed controlling of, the legal status of the other
party. In a very real sense, the two are treated as one. This is entirely
different from a case in which there is simply a lack or shortage of evidence to prove a necessary proposition, and the line can be drawn there.
The second possible response to my argument actually draws on
some of what I have already said. One purpose of the hearsay rule is to
exclude evidence the reliability of which is difficult to ascertain. By restricting the hearsay exceptions in a manner which would not admit
Leday's statements when offered against his employer, the Texas courts
were saying, in part, that the statements lacked sufficient reliability to
merit their consideration by the jury. And to the extent that a jury is
permitted to consider damaging evidence of questionable reliability, the
chance of inaccurate factfinding (and resulting inaccuracy in the assessment of legal rights and responsibilities) increases. Thus, the argument
goes, by excluding the evidence of Leday's out-of-court statements, the
court in Big Mack was actually serving rather than impeding the substantive policy of holding liable in situations such as these only those
individuals who have acted negligently.
This argument carries some weight in the abstract. The rules admitting certain party statements (both against them and against others), after all, are not normally justified on the basis of reliability. Instead, they
find their justification in the adversary process itself which, it is trusted,
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will reveal the flaws in such statements.4 5 Because of the unpredictability
of the adversary system, it was not irrational for Texas courts to decide
to narrowly restrict the various admissions exceptions, even if more recent codes might have taken a more expansive view. 46 Doing so, it would
be argued, protects the value of accurate adjudication.
The problem is that this argument carries very little weight as applied to the facts of Big Mack. If Leday's statements had disavowed
responsibility or otherwise exculpated himself or his employer, there
would be significant reason to doubt their reliability, and a rational set of
evidence rules could exclude them. But here the statements were highly
inculpatory. There is no reason to believe Leday would have made them
unless he truly thought he was at fault, and there is every reason to believe that at the time he made the statements, he was in a good position
to assess the facts accurately. Though minor questions of his memory
and of ambiguity might be raised,4 7 the reliability of these statements
seems quite high. Thus, while the principle represented by Big Mack
might be defended in some cases as increasing the likelihood of accurate
decision-making, its application to this case is inappropriate.
The rationale of Big Mack might well be wrong even as applied to a
case in which the reliability of the statements is somewhat more doubtful.
Two things are at stake in such a situation. First is the respondeat superior rule itself. This is a true rule of substantive law; it establishes rights
and obligations, and is designed at least in part to control external conduct. The second is the general goal of accurate adjudication. This is
only an indirectly substantive goal; it does not establish legal rights, but
45. "Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the
theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than
satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule. No guarantee of trustworthiness is required
in the case of an admission." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note (citations
omitted). Perhaps the result of Big Mack can be justified on the ground that while we can
trust the adversary system to give Leday the opportunity to raise doubts about the validity of
his own inculpatory statements (and we therefore do not mind that he could not cross-examine
himself at the time he made the statements), we are not willing to force his employer to forego
the right of contemporaneous cross-examination, at least as long as no hearsay exception
applies.
46. These statements appear to fit within Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D), admitting "a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship." FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(D).
47. Because Leday's statements partly concerned past conditions and conduct, flaws in his
memory might have existed. Without an opportunity to conduct a contemporaneous crossexamination, it might be difficult to reveal these flaws. Similarly, even though the statements
seem reasonably clear on their face, it is possible that the statements did not accurately convey
Leday's meaning. Such problems could be revealed more easily with contemporaneous testing
than with cross-examination much later at trial.
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only seeks to assure that such fights are judicially protected. Adherence
to the respondeat superior rule suggests admission, while adherence to
the goal of accurate adjudication suggests exclusion. If it is difficult to
follow both rules in the same case, it is useful to assess which rule is more
important and to adhere to that rule.
Put differently, we should ask whether greater harm would come
from violating the basic rule of respondeat superior or the general goal of
accurate adjudication. The former is the more fundamental rule, particularly given that accurate adjudication is more of an aspirational goal
than a reality in many cases anyway, and more harm would come from
violating the respondeat superior rule as long as there is reasonable evidence admissible against the servant to suggest tortious conduct in the
scope of employment. In such a case, there will be some evidence of
wrongdoing and additionally, the opponent can conduct at least some
cross-examination and offer argument concerning the reliability of the
evidence. This suggests that the risk of inaccurate adjudication is not
that great in any event, and that it is at least theoretically possible that
both goals can be satisfied.
In sum, the basic structural underpinnings of our legal system might
well mandate that the Big Mack rule be rejected. Although rejecting that
rule would arguably do violence to the doctrine of limited admissibility4"
and perhaps to the hearsay rule as applied in that case,4 9 adhering to the
Texas court's result does more violence to the hierarchy of legal rules,
arguably a more important set of principles than any individual rule of
evidence. Rules designed primarily to facilitate the proof of substantive
claims, assure fair treatment of parties and allocate functions among the
decision makers in the trial cannot be elevated above the application of
the rules that gave rise to the trial in the first place. And to the extent
that the trial seeks not just to discover truth and vindicate formal legal
rights but also to provide a forum for the satisfactory resolution of disputes, the rule of Big Mack must be viewed with great suspicion.50
48. See FED. R. EVID. 105.
49. The hearsay rule as applied in Big Mack was that "[ain agent's hearsay statements
should be received against the principal as vicarious admissions only when the trial judge finds,
as a preliminary fact, that the statements were authorized [by the principal]." Big Mack
Trucking Co. v. Dickerson, 497 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tex. 1973), superseded by TEx. R. Civ.

tvID. 801(e)(2)(D).

50. The Big Mack rule has not survived in Texas. Recently Texas adopted the new Rule
801(e)(2)(D), which admits the agent's statement if it was made during the existence of the
relationship and if it concerns a matter within the scope of employment even if it was not
authorized by the employer. See TEX. R. CIv. EVID. 801(e)(2)(D). In Fajtik v. First Nat'l
Bank, 752 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), the Texas appellate court held that the new rule
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VI.
In this Essay, I have tried to explore the complex interrelationship
between the rules that establish the rights and responsibilities of social
actors and the rules that govern the ways in which those rights and responsibilities can be proven in our formal trial proceedings. I have only
scratched the surface of this complex problem. For the most part, our
evidence rules seem to work alongside substantive rules and to help further-or at least not impede-certain underlying goals of the law. At
times, however, the law of evidence has been construed in a manner
which elevates its status over that of the substantive law, and this is a
result the wisdom of which merits further study. Perhaps this Essay can
help point the direction for fruitful consideration of the relative places of
our many systems of legal rules.

"'overturns the much criticized holding of [Big Mack]." Id. at 672 n.3 (quoting Olin Guy
Wellborn III, Article VIl" Hearsay, 20 Hous. L. REv. 477, 502 (1983)).
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